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Abstract: 
 
Recent studies have debated the impact of investor protection law on corporate behavior 
and value.  I exploit the staggered passage of state securities fraud statutes (“blue sky 
laws”) in the United States to estimate the causal effects of investor protection law on 
firm financing decisions and investment activity.  The statutes induce firms to increase 
dividends, issue equity, and grow in size.  The laws also facilitate improvements in 
operating performance and market valuations.  Overall, the evidence is strongly 
supportive of theoretical models that predict investor protection law has a significant 
impact on corporate policy and performance.   
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Introduction 
Recent studies in corporate governance have debated the importance of legal 
institutions in shaping financial development.  One particular aspect of the legal 
environment that has received significant attention is the legal protection of investors 
from managerial expropriation.  Both the theoretical and the empirical literature reach 
mixed conclusions on the impact of investor protection on firm decisions.  On one hand, 
a number of theories predict that investor safeguards have a significant impact on 
corporate policies.  These theories are supported by empirical studies that find cross-
country differences in firm financing and investment patterns.  These differences are 
attributed to heterogeneous investor protections engendered by disparate legal origins (La 
Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (henceforth LLSV) 1997, 2002).  On the 
other hand, some scholars argue that cross-country differences in financing and 
investment patterns do not adequately capture the causal impact of legal development on 
corporate policy (Rajan and Zingales 2003, Pagano and Volpin 2001, 2005).  Moreover, 
various studies examine time-series variation in investor protection laws within countries 
such as the U.K. and Italy and find little impact of the laws on ownership dispersion and 
financial development (Franks, Mayer, and Rossi 2009, Aganin and Volpin 2005). 
Empirical identification of the impact of investor protection law on corporate 
policy requires a setting in which legal protections are well-defined and exhibit variation 
that is independent of factors otherwise correlated with firms’ decisions.  I exploit the 
staggered passage of state investor protection statutes, also known as the blue sky laws, in 
the U.S. during the early 1900’s to identify the causal impact of investor protection law 
on firms in the mining industry.  I compare the impact of the blue sky laws on companies 
in states which introduce statutes during the sample period to contemporaneous changes 
in companies located in other states.  I also evaluate differences in the operating 
performance and market valuations among firms within these two groups. 
This paper addresses several critical limitations of previous empirical studies on 
the impact of investor protection law on corporate policy and performance.  First, it 
focuses on cross-sectional and time-series variation in investor protections within a single 
common law country; legal origin is fixed across states.  Second, I evaluate the impact of 
statutes that were specifically aimed at reducing expropriation of shareholders by 
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corporate insiders in an environment where investor fraud was rampant (Seligman 2003).  
The legal protections promulgated by the laws are arguably more closely linked to the 
theories developed by LLSV (1997) than measures of investor protections used in many 
other studies (LLS 2008, Coffee 2001).  Third, I exploit exogenous variation in investor 
protection laws that is likely independent of unobservable variables which otherwise 
impact firm financing and investment decisions (an identification assumption explored in 
greater detail below).  Examples of such factors are political lobbying efforts, changes in 
investment opportunities, and unobserved economic and financial shocks.  
Regression estimates indicate that the blue sky laws have significantly positive 
effects on corporate policy and performance.  The statutes cause firms to increase their 
dividend payouts to shareholders by approximately 6.2% to 13%.  In the early 1900’s, 
investors in mining companies frequently looked to stock investments as dependable 
sources of dividend income but were often falsely promised extraordinary returns during 
security issuance.  The blue sky laws appear to have given investors a legal fulcrum to 
exert pressure on firms to disgorge excess cash that could otherwise be expropriated by 
insiders.  This finding is consistent with the “outcome model” of dividends and investor 
protections (LLSV 2000).   
However, while firms pay out larger dividends to investors, they are also able to 
raise greater financing from capital markets, ostensibly because investors are less 
concerned about managers absconding issuance proceeds.  Treated mining firms increase 
equity outstanding by 10% to 13.7% after the introduction of investor protection laws.  In 
turn, sample companies use this capital to invest in PPE and grow in size; total levels of 
physical capital increase by at least 29% while firm assets increase by at least 19%.  
These results are not surprising given the nature of mining operations.  The vast majority 
of assets in mining firms are devoted to Plant, Property, and Equipment (in particular, 
property), as the primary function of these firms is to extract minerals and metal ores 
from the land that they own.  By raising additional capital from equity markets, mining 
companies are able to quickly procure tracts suitable for exploration and excavation.   
To verify that these changes in corporate policy are profitable, I also examine the 
impact of the blue sky laws on operating margins and market valuations.  Estimates 
illustrate that the laws on average lead to 6% growth in ROA, though this increase is only 
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realized two years after the laws are passed.  The delay in profit realization likely stems 
from technological constraints on mining production during the sample period; it takes 
time for ores to be discovered, excavated, and sold.  In contrast, market valuations rise 
almost immediately by at least 21.7%.  This finding reflects the market’s positive 
anticipation of subsequent dividend increases resulting from improved investor 
protection.  
The results are consistent with anecdotal evidence that the blue sky laws had an 
immediate impact on fraudulent issuers and quickly made capital widely available to 
legitimate enterprises (Nation’s Business 1917).  More generally, the findings are 
strongly supportive of theoretical models that link investor protection law to various 
corporate policies.  These models predict that stronger safeguards lead to greater 
interaction between firms and capital markets, increased investment, and improvements 
in overall value (LLSV 1997, 1998, LLS 2008, Shleifer and Wolfenzon 2002, Fulghieri 
and Suominen 2010).       
The causal interpretation of the evidence relies on the identifying assumption that 
the passage of the blue sky laws is independent of unobserved factors that otherwise 
impact corporate policy.  I support this assumption by citing numerous anecdotes in the 
academic literature and business press that describe the legislative environment in the 
early 1900’s.  As I describe in detail in Section 2, the motivation for introducing the laws 
is largely attributed to widespread securities fraud at the turn of the 20th century 
(Seligman 1983, Reed and Washburn 1921, Mulvey 1914).  Firms and securities 
salesmen often took advantage of “naïve” investors by selling them securities backed by 
little more than a promise of high returns (Nation’s Business 1917, 1922).  The prevailing 
view of the blue sky laws is that the legislation aimed to reduce insider expropriation of 
investment proceeds that was commonplace after issuance.  The empirical strategy thus 
provides an ideal setting for estimating the impact of investor protection law on corporate 
policy.          
To further justify causation, I also perform a variety of analyses to evaluate 
alternative explanations for the findings, each of which effectively amounts to a violation 
of the identification assumption.  First, I examine whether the blue sky laws were 
introduced in response to or in conjunction with unobservable changes in investment 
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opportunities or other factors related to corporate decisions. I find that there are no 
significant pre-existing trends in firm policy and performance prior to the passage of the 
laws.  The estimated impact of the laws is significant only after the adoption of the laws.  
I also examine the effects of the blue sky laws on firms located in Michigan and West 
Virginia.  Both states initially passed blue sky laws in 1913, however, the laws were 
declared unconstitutional by federal courts soon thereafter.  The states then passed 
modified versions of the laws in 1915 which were upheld by the Supreme Court.  I 
observe changes in corporate policy and performance for firms in these two states only 
after the laws are passed in 1915—not after the laws are introduced in 1913.  The 
evidence suggests that regression estimates do not suffer from biases resulting from 
unobserved changes in factors that are correlated with corporate decision making.   
Second, I examine the political economy of the blue sky laws and evaluate 
whether the laws appear to be driven by private lobbying interests.  One alternative 
hypothesis, postulated by Macey and Miller (1991), is that the laws were passed at the 
behest of banks that competed with industrial firms for investor capital.  They theorize 
that firms’ increased costs of regulatory compliance would get passed onto investors, 
who would then redirect their capital from equity markets into banks.  This theory has 
little explanatory power, however, because it would imply that the blue sky laws should 
have deleterious effects on corporate policy, rather than the positive effects documented 
in this paper.   
Another alternative hypothesis is that the blue sky laws were a manifestation of 
political lobbying efforts by incumbent mining firms.  While this supposition has not 
been mentioned in the existing literature, it is possible that increased costs of legal 
compliance reduced competition and entry by potential mining startups, allowing 
incumbent firms to more easily raise capital and grow in size.  To test this theory, I 
analyze product market data on output quantities, prices, new firm incorporations, and 
capital stock authorization. I find that the blue sky laws are associated with increased 
output, similar or lower product prices, greater firm creation, and larger capital issuance.  
In contrast to this hypothesis, product markets do not appear to be less competitive after 
the passage of the blue sky laws, which suggests that the statutes were not simply the 
outcomes of industrial lobbying efforts.   
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Finally, I test whether the observed impact of the blue sky laws occurs through 
the channel of reduced expropriation risk or through the channel of securities pre-
clearance by the government.  The statutes provided investors with a legal basis for 
recovering damages from firms that were deemed to be fraudulent following public 
security issuances.  In addition, many laws also required that securities be registered with 
the government prior to any public offering.  It is therefore possible that the impact of the 
blue sky laws is manifest through the reduction of adverse selection during securities pre-
clearance rather than through the reduction of ex-post expropriation.  I distinguish these 
channels by analyzing firms in Maine; Maine’s law did not require security screening but 
did prohibit fraud after issuance.  The findings indicate that the law in Maine has large 
effects that mirror the impact of the laws for the full sample of firms.  Overall, the results 
suggest that the salient feature of the blue sky laws is the prohibition of investor 
expropriation by corporate insiders.   
 This paper makes several contributions.  First, this study utilizes a new dataset 
and methodology to address debate regarding the impact of investor protection law on 
corporate policy and performance.1
 The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows.  Section 2 contains institutional 
background describing the blue sky laws and the various political economy explanations 
for their passage.  Section 3 describes the data.  Section 4 contains the analysis.  Section 5 
concludes.   
  The findings also help distinguish among various 
theories that make disparate predictions regarding the links between investor protection 
law and corporate policies such as dividend payouts.  The results are strongly supportive 
of the theoretical models developed by LLSV (1997, 1998) and others.  Second, this 
paper contributes to recent policy discussion over the development of financial markets in 
emerging countries by highlighting the potential outcomes of governance reforms 
(Klapper and Love, 2002).    
 
 
                                                 
1 Papers in this area include Carlin and Gervais (2010), Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998), Fisman 
and Love (2004), Foley and Greenwood (2010), Glaeser, Johnson, and Shleifer (2001), Guiso, Sapienza, 
and Zingales (2004, 2008), King and Levine (1993), Levine (1997), La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and 
Shleifer (2003, 2007), Rajan and Zingales (1998), and Wurgler (2000), among many others. 
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Section 2:  Institutional Background 
The blue sky laws are securities fraud statutes that were passed by various states 
between 1911 and 1931.  The motivation for the laws was to prevent investor 
expropriation by insiders, such as managers and securities dealers.  The laws required 
that security issuers and dealers register with state governments prior to issuing public 
securities, and mandated that they had to receive approval from the government before 
selling any securities in the state (Mahoney 2003).  Perhaps most importantly, the laws 
provided investors with a legal basis and cause of action for recovering assets 
fraudulently expropriated by security issuers or salesmen, even after a significant passage 
of time between the initial security purchase and the time of the alleged expropriation 
(Read and Washburn 1921, Virginia Law Review 1937).    
Prior to the Securities Act of 1933 and the formation of the SEC with the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, federal securities regulation in the United States was 
largely nonexistent (Seligman, 2003).  In addition, there was little in the way of state 
securities market regulation prior to the passage of the blue sky laws (Macey and Miller 
1991).  Different states in the U.S. passed blue sky statutes at different times, exhibiting 
heterogeneity in the requirements that were placed upon securities issuers.  The first 
investor protection law was passed in Kansas in 1911, the second in Arizona in 1912.  In 
1913, many states such as California, Maine, Missouri, Montana, and Texas passed blue 
sky laws.  Two states, Michigan and West Virginia, passed laws in 1913, which were 
soon after declared unconstitutional by lower federal courts (Alabama &c. Co. v. Doyle, 
201 Fed 173; Compton v. Allen, 216 Fed. 537; Bracey v. Darst, 218 Fed. 482).  These 
states later proposed and passed modified versions of the original laws in 1915.  The 
modified statutes were upheld by the Supreme Court (Hall v. Geiger-Jones, 242 U.S. 
539; Caldwell v. Sioux Falls Co., 242 U.S. 559; Merrick v. N.W. Halsey & Co., 242 U.S. 
568).  Almost all states in the sample passed blue sky laws that required securities pre-
clearance prior to any public offerings and prohibited ex-post fraud.  Maine was the lone 
exception, as its statute did not require securities pre-clearance; it only prohibited ex-post 
fraud (Mahoney 2003).  
The motivation for passing the blue sky laws is largely attributed to rampant 
securities fraud at the turn of the 20th century (Seligman 1983, Reed and Washburn 1921, 
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Mulvey 1914).  Scholars and contemporary press articles claim that a large number of 
firms and securities salesmen took advantage of “naïve” investors by selling them 
securities backed by little more than a promise of extraordinary returns (Nation’s 
Business 1917, 1922).  In fact, the colloquial name of the ‘blue sky’ laws is attributed to 
the opinion of Justice Joseph McKenna in Hall v. Geiger-Jones: 
 
The name that is given to the law indicates the evil at which it is aimed – that is, to use 
the language of a cited case, “speculative schemes which have no more basis than so 
many feet of blue sky;” or, as stated by counsel in another case, “to stop the sale of stock 
in fly-by-night concerns, visionary oil wells, distant gold mines, and other like fraudulent 
exploitations.”   
 
The types of firms targeted by the laws were largely companies in the mining, oil, 
and gas sectors (Reed and Washburn 1921).  Some states, such as North Dakota (Comp. 
Law, Secs. 4989-4994) and Connecticut (Conn. Gen. St., Sec. 3461-3464) went so far as 
to introduce statutes aimed specifically at regulating the sale of mining securities.  Firms 
in these industries were among the most likely to approach investors with intangible 
assets and highly speculative business plans that would later turn out to be facades for 
fraudulent operations (Mahoney 2003).  Examples of such fraud are plentiful.  The 
following accounts from Nation’s Business (1922) describe common occurrences among 
duped investors: 
 
One man was induced to invest in a Mississippi oil company by a friend who had gone to 
work for the concern.  Through the Investors’ Protective Committee he finally learned the 
truth about the fake stock and further, “that there had never been a barrel of oil found in 
Mississippi,” and that the company from which the securities were bought could not even 
be located.  
 
In another instance, one woman wrote: 
 
A year ago last July, 1920, a sleek, smooth-talking agent came to my house and began to 
talk oil to me, and he said my money would be giving me big dividends just as soon as 
the wells were operating….Well, the last I have heard is they cannot go on with the 
drilling until the investors come forward with another 20 percent cash payment on their 
investment, otherwise it’s a foregone conclusion of the whole matter.   
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To combat such behavior, state legislators developed the blue sky laws to prevent 
fraudulent security issuances.  The first law was passed by Kansas in 1911, promoted in 
large part by J. N. Dolley, the Kansas state banking commissioner.  Dolley claimed in a 
set of newspaper articles in 1910 that Kansas widows were duped into purchasing 
fraudulent securities and that legislation was required to “remove these financial cancers 
entirely from [the] state” (Macey and Miller 1991).  After Kansas approved its investor 
protection statute in 1911, many other states quickly followed suit; eventually all other 
states (excluding Nevada) passed laws similar to Kansas between 1912 and 1931. 
A typical blue sky law would require a firm to submit information about its 
operations and financial characteristics to the state banking commission prior to issuing 
securities.  The types of information collected by regulators would include a listing of 
officers and directors, historical financial information, state of incorporation, properties, 
and locations of operating units.  This data was collected to verify legitimacy of the 
offering and provide public records of company activity should the firm be liable for 
committing fraud after a security issuance.  Firms would also be required to provide 
additional information at the request of state officials, either at the time of the proposed 
offering or any time thereafter.  An example of such information was the proposed use of 
capital raised through the security issue.  In addition, firms would be subject to 
appraisals, audits, and investigations of properties by state officials.  Such reviews would 
be at the expense of the issuer rather than the government.  If the security offering was 
approved by officials, the firm would receive a permit to sell securities to the public 
within the state.  Finally, the laws provided a cause of action for investors who claimed 
fraud by security issuers.  If a firm was found liable by courts to have committed 
securities fraud, by absconding investor funds or misusing assets for example, then 
investors would be able to recover damages from the firm via judicial proceedings (Reed 
and Washburn 1921, Virginia Law Review 1937).   
The laws applied to the state of location where a firm sold securities, which was 
often coincident with the state of incorporation of the firm.  During the early 1900’s, 
external financing was quite localized, given technological constraints, information 
barriers, and the relatively high costs of communication across dispersed investors.  For 
example, Wright (2002) finds that the vast majority of shareholders for companies 
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incorporated in Maine were also local residents of Maine.  In the empirical estimation of 
this paper, since information on the location of shareholders involved in public issuance 
activity during the sample period is not publicly available, the state of incorporation is 
assumed to be the location for a non-trivial fraction of a given firm’s shareholders.2
There is ample anecdotal evidence that the laws had a binding effect on the 
behavior of security issuers both large and small.  Mulvey (1914) performed an audit 
study of the regulatory actions of the state banking commission of Kansas, the earliest 
adopter of the blue sky laws, and found that within 2 years of the adoption of the law in 
1911, Kansas had already denied the applications of a number of firms to sell their 
securities in Kansas.  Additionally, the Kansas state banking commissioner issued a 
report in 1912 stating that between “fourteen and fifteen hundred companies have been 
investigated by this department since the enactment of this law, and of this, less than one 
hundred have been granted permits to sell their securities in Kansas” (Mulvey, 1914).  
   
There were many reasons why security offerings were denied.  For example, in 
1924, the Continental Gas and Electric Corp., a 12 year old firm, wished to issue 
securities to purchase a controlling interest in the Kansas City Power and Light 
Company.  Continental planned to raise at least $5,000,000 worth of stock in order to 
consummate the purchase.  The commissioner of banking in Missouri, however, raised 
objections to the value of the Kansas City Power and Light Co., arguing that after the 
deduction of intangible items, cost of financing, and reserves for depreciation, the value 
of Kansas City Power and Light was too low to justify the proposed offering.  As a result, 
Continental’s application to issue stock in Missouri was denied in order to protect the 
public from an unsafe offering (Barron’s, 1924). 
The blue sky laws did not just impact firms at the security issuance stage.  Often 
times, the laws would be invoked during court proceedings by investors who sought to 
recover damages from firms well after securities offerings (Reed and Washburn 1921, 
                                                 
2 This assumption is further supported in three ways.  First, most mining firms in the sample have common 
states of incorporation and operation, which is to be expected given that mining location decisions are 
typically based on the geographic proximity of ore deposits.  Huberman (2001) and Coval and Moskowitz 
(1999) find that shareholders have a bias towards owning shares of local companies; this bias is likely to be 
even larger during the sample period.  Second, the findings in Table 10 support the link between state of 
incorporation and blue sky law jurisdiction.  Third, a violation of this assumption would suggest that 
regression estimates in this study understate the true impact of the laws on corporate policy, since the laws 
would not necessarily have a binding impact on a firm’s investors.     
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Virginia Law Review 1937).  One example of such a case is Edward v. Ioor (205 Mich. 
617), in which the court ruled in favor of the plaintiff who wished to receive 
compensation for activity committed by a firm in violation of the blue sky laws.  Another 
example is Kneeland v. Emerton (280 Mass. 371).  Overall, the various ways in which the 
blue sky laws applied to securities offerings reflects a significant improvement in the 
legal protection of investors from securities fraud in the early 1900’s.   
Although most anecdotal evidence and academic research points to the reduction 
of securities fraud as the chief aim of regulators who passed the blue sky laws, some 
argue that there were other motivations for the statutes.  For example, the laws may have 
been the outcomes of political processes that did not fully reflect the public interests of 
state constituents.  Macey and Miller (1991) argue that the laws were promoted by the 
private interests of small banks who wished to reduce competition with securities 
salesmen for depositors’ funds.  They claim that regulatory compliance raised the costs of 
security issuance.  In response, firms would pass these increased costs onto investors, 
who would then prefer to invest in bank deposits rather than corporate securities.  This 
theory would suggest that the passage of the blue sky laws would be associated with 
deleterious effects on firm corporate policies and performance. 
Another potential motivation for the passage of the blue sky laws is a variant of 
the political economy hypothesis developed by Rajan and Zingales (2003).3
 
  They argue 
that some of the differences in investor protection levels across countries can be 
attributed to the political influence of incumbent firms that promote capital market 
regulations as means of limiting product market entry by competitors.  In the context of 
the blue sky laws, this reasoning might suggest that incumbent firms in various states 
were instrumental at promoting the passage of state investor protection statutes.  While 
anecdotal evidence does not suggest that such lobbying took place, this hypothesis is 
directly tested in Section 4.   
 
 
 
                                                 
3 See Volpin and Pagano (2001, 2005) for similar models.   
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Section 3: Data 
The dataset is constructed using several hand-collected sources of information.  
First, I identify all mining firms which appear in the monthly “Banking and General 
Quotation” section of the December issues of the Commercial and Financial Chronicle 
(CFC) from 1908 to 1917.4  I choose this set of firms for three reasons.  First, this list of 
firms has publicly traded stock with published prices, allowing me to track share prices 
using publicly available information over time (Brown, Mulherin, and Weidenmier, 
2008).  Second, I examine the entire universe of firms for which data is available in order 
to mitigate the possibility of survivorship or attrition bias in the regression analysis.  That 
is, I include all firms for which data is available prior to the passage of the first blue sky 
law in 1911(mitigating survivorship bias) and I also include all firms for which data is 
available after the passage of the first law (reducing attrition bias).5
For each firm which appears in the CFC mining stock quotations, I then collect 
background characteristics and financial statement information from the Poor’s Manuals 
of Industrial Securities, volumes 1910 to 1918.  Each volume typically contains several 
years of (overlapping) historical data for each firm.  Where available, I obtain brief 
descriptions of the company, state and year of incorporation, names of officers and 
directors, names of exchanges on which its stock is traded, historical balance sheet and 
income statement data.  I confirm whether each firm is in the mining industry from the 
company’s name and from the company’s business description.  Each firm has varying 
amounts of information, both across accounting variables as well as over time.   
  Third, as discussed 
in Section 2, I focus on the mining industry because firms in this sector were considered 
the most likely to commit shareholder expropriation and are therefore a natural sample 
for estimating the impact of investor protection laws on corporate policy (Mahoney 2003, 
Seligman 2003).  For each firm, the CFC provides par values of stock, as well as bid and 
ask quotes for common shares outstanding.   
In addition to firms which appear in the CFC, the Poor’s manuals also contain 
financial statement information for mining firms lacking published stock price data.  I use 
                                                 
4 The years 1908 to 1917 are primarily chosen because of data availability and to allow for approximately 5 
years of stock price data before and after the passage of most sample laws.   
5 The results are unaffected by whether we restrict the sample to firms which appear only before or only 
after the passage of the first blue sky law in 1911. 
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the 1910 Poor’s volume to identify such companies and I track their balance sheet and 
income statement characteristics over time using subsequent Poor’s manuals.6  I include 
these firms to provide a more comprehensive dataset for analysis, though it is worth 
noting that all the results hold even if we restrict attention to the reduced sample of firms 
for which stock prices are available.7
I also collect various types of product market data.  Many companies in the 
mining industry publicly disclose “statements of operations” in the Poor’s manuals.  I use 
these statements to assemble data on the types of metal ores produced, the quantities sold 
each year, and the market prices of all goods.  I then collect aggregate data on new firm 
incorporations and authorized capital stock in IPO’s from 1900 to 1930 for 12 states 
(Evans, 1948).  The observations are defined at the state-year level for firms across all 
industries.  For each state, I am able to determine the number of new firms (small or 
large, based on median size indices in Evans (1948) and the amount of authorized equity 
for these firms at the IPO stage.  Assembling all of this information yields a final, 
unbalanced panel dataset of firm balance sheet data, income statement information, stock 
prices, and product market characteristics. 
   
Given the data collection methods and institutional features of the blue sky laws, 
it is possible that there are several sources of selection bias in the regression estimates.  
First, because data are collected from Poor’s manuals, it is likely that sample firms 
represent relatively larger, older companies in the U.S. since financial information about 
such companies was likely to be more accessible than that of smaller, younger firms.  
This source of bias is unlikely to be problematic, however, since larger, older firms 
would likely be impacted by the blue sky laws less than smaller, younger firms due to the 
likelihood of larger, older firms already having mitigated investors’ concerns of 
expropriation through established reputations (Nation’s Business 1917).  Thus, such 
sample selection would likely cause the regression analysis to underestimate the true 
impact of the laws on the average firm in the population during the sample period.   
                                                 
6 I use the 1910 volume to identify firms which operate prior to the passage of the first blue sky law in 
1911, to mitigate concerns of survivorship bias.   
7 Additionally, I restrict attention to firms in the U.S.  If Canadian firms are added to the sample as a 
control group, the results are the same. 
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Second, in response to the passage of the blue sky laws, it is conceivable that 
some firms could relocate to new states of incorporation.  For example, a poorly 
performing firm belonging to a state which passes a blue sky law may choose to 
reincorporate in a state without a blue sky law to better avoid securities registration costs 
and securities fraud liability.  Such behavior, however, does not appear to be relevant for 
firms in our sample; almost all sample firms are incorporated well before 1913 and do not 
reincorporate during the sample period.  It is likely that geographic proximity to mineral 
tracts figures most prominently in mining firm’s location decisions, particularly during 
the sample time period. Thus, it is unlikely that regression estimates are biased by sample 
firm location decisions.8
Table 1 contains information on the timing of the blue sky laws and lists the 
number of firms in each state within the dataset.  Overall, the dataset contains 
information on firms in 25 states, with the largest number of observations stemming from 
firms in states such as Maine and Michigan, which pass blue sky laws in 1913 and 1915, 
respectively, and firms in New Jersey, which passes its blue sky law in 1920.  As the 
table illustrates, almost all states pass a blue sky law within a narrow window, from 1912 
to 1923.  The small window for the passage of the laws is helpful for the empirical 
strategy because it mitigates the potential concern that the measured response of firms to 
the blue sky laws is biased because the firms are responding in very different (i.e. 
incomparable) economic times.
   
9
Table 2 contains descriptive statistics of sample firm characteristics. There are a 
total of 152 unique firms with balance sheet data for the years 1899 to 1918, yielding a 
dataset of 1215 firm-year observations.
  [Set Table  1 about here.] 
10
                                                 
8 It is also unlikely that the estimates are biased by a “Delaware effect” (Daines 2001).  As explained by 
Subramaniam (2004), Delaware’s charter laws became an issue primarily in the 1960s after a number of 
law changes were passed which caused Delaware to become the most popular destination for much of the 
incorporation activity at the time.  While today around half of all U.S. firms are incorporated in Delaware, 
less than 10% of sample firms are incorporated there.  To further verify that Delaware incorporated firms 
do not bias the regression estimates, I run all regression in Section 4 with Delaware firms removed from the 
sample; all regression results remain the same.   
  As Panel A indicates, the average year of 
incorporation is 1898; almost all sample firms are incorporated several years before an 
investor protection law is passed.  The average age of a firm in the sample is 15 years.  
9 Additionally, in tabulations not reported here, there are relatively similar numbers of observations for 
firms in the control vs. treatment groups in each year in the sample starting from 1913 onwards. 
10 The vast majority of firms have data from 1910 to 1917. 
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Panel B summarizes sample firm balance sheet and income statement characteristics in 
1910, prior to the passage of the first blue sky law in 1911, separately for all firms, firms 
located in states which pass blue sky laws during the sample period, and firms located in 
states which pass blue sky laws after the sample period (i.e. after 1918).  As explained in 
the Analysis section, because the laws are staggered across time and eventually passed by 
all sample states (except Nevada), this breakdown of firms does not reflect two disparate 
groups of control vs. treated firms in the regression framework.  In the estimation, any 
firm in a state which has not yet passed a law is a ‘control’ firm, while any company in a 
state where a law has been passed is a ‘treatment’ firm.  For example, all firms in 
Michigan are control firms until 1915.11
The average firm produces $3.57 million in sales in 1910; approximately 27% of 
sales are distributed as dividends to equity holders.  The high payout percentage could be 
the result of greater investor demand for dividends during this time period (Nation’s 
Business 1922, Miller 1977) or could reflect firms’ desire to signal their quality in a 
market lacking alternative means of quality differentiation (Miller and Rock 1985, John 
and Williams 1985).  The mean book value of assets is $15.5 million, with 69% of assets 
invested in Plant, Property, and Equipment (PPE).  The relatively high fraction of assets 
in PPE is not surprising, given that the main assets of mining companies are the 
properties containing mineral tracts and the machines used for exploration and extraction.  
Sample firms have approximately 610,000 common shares outstanding, with a market 
capitalization of $13.2 million.  Mean operating profitability, proxied by return on assets 
(ROA) is 14%, while market capitalization-to-free cash flow ratios are approximately 
7.77 for all sample companies.  T-tests indicate that firm characteristics between the two 
groups depicted in Panel B are statistically indistinguishable, though it is worth 
reemphasizing that any potential differences are muted by the fact that all sample firms 
are control (treatment) firms prior to (after) the passage of their respective states’ blue 
  Additionally, all results hold when the sample is 
restricted to firms in states which pass the laws during the sample period.  [Set Table  2 
about here.] 
                                                 
11 See Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003) for a similar explanation.   
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sky laws.12
 
  Overall, the sample of firms represents a broad swath of companies in the 
mining industry that appear to be remarkably similar across a number of observable 
dimensions.   
Section 4: Analysis 
The effects of the blue sky laws on the financing and investment decisions of 
sample firms are estimated using the following Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression 
model: 
 
Dependent Var. = α + β1(IPLawit) + β2(Firmi) + β3(Yeart) + β4(Controlsit) + εit, (1) 
 
where subscripts it uniquely identify individual observations for firm i in year t.  In the 
subsections which follow, there are a number of different dependent variables that reflect 
various aspects of firms’ corporate policies: Dividendsit/Salesit, Ln(Shares Oustandingit), 
Ln(PPEit), Ln(Assetsit), ROAit, and Market Capit/Cash Flowit.  IPLawit is an indicator of 
whether the state of incorporation of firm i has passed an Investor Protection (IP) Law by 
year t.  Firmi and Yeart denote firm and year fixed effects, respectively.  Controlsit are 
various controls which may vary by firm and year.13
The coefficient for IPLawit is effectively a difference-in-difference estimate of the 
average impact of investor protection laws on the dependent variable of interest.  In this 
framework, any firm incorporated in a state which has not yet passed a law is considered 
a control firm, while any firm in a state where a law has been passed is considered a 
treatment firm.  This assignment into treatment and control groups is due to the staggered 
passage of the laws across states, all of which eventually adopt investor protection 
statutes (except for Nevada).
   
14
                                                 
12 This issue is further addressed in the Analysis section.  It is also worth noting that the regression results 
are not driven by outliers in the sample; all regressions results are the same, if not stronger, for samples 
winsorized at the 1% and 5% tails.     
  Firm fixed effects are included to ensure that static 
13 These controls include measures of sales growth and (log) firm age.  Sales growth is sometimes used as a 
proxy for investment opportunities (LLSV 2000), but is likely to be an endogenous outcome variable that 
should be excluded as a regressor.  The coefficient for Ln(firm age) is primarily estimated off the concavity 
of the log function, and is difficult to interpret in the presence of year fixed effects.  For these reasons, I 
report results for specifications excluding these controls, though it is worth noting that the estimated 
treatment effects are similar when these controls are included in the regression analysis.  
14 For a similar formulation, see Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003).  
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differences across companies do not account for observed patterns in investment and 
financing.  Year fixed effects control for time period-specific changes in investment and 
financing.  Standard errors are clustered by state in order to control for residual 
correlations of the error terms across firms within a given state (Bertrand, Duflo, 
Mullainathan 2004).15
To shed light on the dynamics of the average treatment effect before and after the 
passage of a law, IPLaw in specification (1) is replaced by variables IPLaw_Before and 
IPLaw_After.  The resulting equation is the following OLS regression (time trends) 
model: 
   
 
Dependent Var. = α + β1(IPLaw_Beforeit(-2)) + β2(IPLaw_Beforeit(-1)) + 
β3(IPLaw_Afterit(0)) + β4(IPLaw_Afterit(1)) + β5(IPLaw_Afterit(2+)) + β6(Firmi) 
+ β7(Yeart) + β8(Controlsit) + εit, 
(2) 
 
IPLawit_Beforeit(-2, -1) is an indicator for whether the observation for firm i in year t 
takes place (2 years, 1 year) before an investor protection law is passed in the state of 
firm i.  IPLawit_Afterit(0, 1, 2+) is an indicator for whether the observation for firm i in 
year t takes place (0 years, 1 year, 2 or more years) after an investor protection law is 
passed in the state of firm i.   
The coefficients on these terms provide estimates of the average changes in the 
dependent variable of interest in the immediate years preceding and following the 
passage of a blue sky law.  The estimates are useful for evaluating the possibility that the 
investor protection statutes were passed either in response to or in conjunction with 
gradual, unobservable changes in investment opportunities in states that passed laws 
during the sample period.  Examples of such changes could consist of growth in product 
demand, improvements in excavation technologies, new discoveries of ore deposits, etc.  
If the laws were passed at the same time that investment opportunities improved in 
sample treatment states, then the coefficient estimates of IPLaw in specification (1) 
would overstate the impact of the blue sky laws on corporate policy and performance. 
Both regression specifications are estimated for various subsamples.  The full 
sample is used for estimating the average (dynamic) impact of investor protection statutes 
                                                 
15 The results are robust to clustering standard errors at the firm-level. 
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for all firms across time.  To explore the possibility that the blue sky laws were passed 
simultaneously with immediate changes in investment opportunities, I also estimate the 
time trends model for a subsample of treated firms in Michigan and West Virginia and 
control firms in states which do not pass blue sky laws during the sample period.  As 
discussed in Section 2, the blue sky statutes in Michigan and West Virginia were initially 
passed in 1913, only to be declared unconstitutional by federal courts shortly thereafter 
(Reed and Washburn 1921).  Both states subsequently revised their laws and passed 
modified blue sky statutes in 1915.  If the laws were proposed and passed at the same 
time that there were immediate changes in unobservable investment opportunities, then 
the impact of the laws should be observed starting in 1913, rather than 1915, for firms in 
Michigan and West Virginia.  Estimates from the time trends model for this subsample of 
data can be used to test this hypothesis.   
I also evaluate whether the impact of the blue sky laws is driven by the 
mechanism of ex-post fraud reduction or by the mechanism of securities pre-clearance.  
As described in Section 2, the blue sky laws provided investors with a legal basis for 
recovering damages from firms that were deemed to be fraudulent following public 
security issuances (Reed and Washburn 1921, Virginia Law Review 1937).  In addition, 
most laws also required that securities be registered with the government prior to any 
public offering.  One exception to the securities pre-clearance feature of the blue sky laws 
was promulgated by Maine in 1913; while Maine’s blue sky prohibited ex-post fraud, it 
did not require firms to register their securities with the government prior to public 
issuance (Mahoney 2003).  I estimate the time trends model for a subsample of treated 
firms in Maine and control firms in states which do not pass blue sky laws during the 
sample period.  The results of this analysis can be used to test whether the blue sky laws 
primarily affect firms through the ex-post reduction of expropriation risk after issuance or 
through the reduction of adverse selection at the pre-clearance stage. 
 
4.1 Financing Decisions 
4.1.1 Payout Policy 
The impact of investor protection law on firm payout policy is estimated using 
specifications (1) and (2) with Dividendsit / Salesit as the dependent variable.  Dividendsit / 
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Salesit is the ratio of common stock dividends to sales for firm i in year t.  The regression 
results are presented in Table 3.  Overall, the results indicate the passage of the blue sky 
laws is associated with an economically large and statistically significant increase in 
dividend payouts.  Column 1 of Table 3 depicts an estimate of 0.062 for the treatment 
effect; when controlling for year fixed effects, the estimate increases to 0.131.  The 
increase in the size of the estimates is not surprising, as there are likely time effects in 
sales and dividend payments across firms.  These figures imply that the blue sky laws are 
associated with a 6.2% to 13% average increase in dividends to sales.  [Set Table 3 about 
here.] 
These results are consistent with various anecdotes concerning the nature of 
investment and securities fraud during the early 1900’s.  As discussed in Section 2, much 
of the fraud which took place in the mining industry during this period stemmed from 
investors being falsely promised extraordinary dividends in return for stock investments.  
Many investors, hoping to receive dividends on the capital they contributed during public 
securities offerings, were expropriated under the guise of legitimate mineral excavation 
and exploration.  The blue sky laws appear to have given investors a legal fulcrum to 
exert pressure on firms to disgorge cash in the form of dividend payments.  This 
mechanism is precisely the “outcome” model of LLSV (2000), which predicts firms 
increase dividend payouts when investor protection laws are stronger in order to mitigate 
the increased (expected) costs of alleged fraud.  Interestingly, the findings reject the 
empirical importance of an alternative theory relating dividends to investor protection 
laws: a “substitute” theory of dividends would suggest dividend payments should 
decrease when investor protection laws are stronger because firms no longer need to pay 
high dividends in order to signal their quality in a weak investor protection regime.  
Empirically, the results illustrate the “outcome” model appears to be more salient than the 
“substitute” model of dividends and investor protection law.      
Columns 3–5 provide evidence further supporting the causal interpretation of the 
treatment effect point estimates in columns 1 and 2.  It is possible that the laws were 
coincident with gradual, unobserved changes in investment opportunities or other 
economic factors specific to each state, thereby causing regression estimates to overstate 
the impact of the blue sky laws on dividends.  To evaluate this alternative hypothesis, 
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column 3 presents estimates of average changes in dividend payments around the passage 
of the blue sky laws.  If dividends are already changing in response to changing, 
unobserved investment opportunities around the passage of the laws, then one should 
observe significant changes in dividend payments in the immediate years preceding the 
passage of the blue sky laws.  In contrast to this hypothesis, however, column 3 shows 
there are no significant changes in dividend payouts in the two years preceding the 
passage of the laws (coefficients for IPLaw_Before(-2) and IPLaw_Before(-1) are 
statistically indistinguishable from zero), while significant changes in dividend payouts 
are observed in the immediate years following the passage of the laws (coefficients for 
IPLaw_After range from 9.3% to 13.6%).  Figure 1 plots the treatment effect coefficients 
and graphically illustrates the observed time pattern in dividend payments around the 
introduction of the blue sky laws.  [Set Figure 1 about here.]    
To verify that the measured changes in dividends are not simply companies’ 
response to immediate, unobserved changes in investment opportunities or other factors 
which affect payout policy, column 4 presents estimates from the time trends model for a 
subsample of firms in Michigan and West Virginia and firms in states which do not pass 
blue sky laws during the sample period.  This subsample analysis is informative because 
Michigan and West Virginia initially passed blue sky laws in 1913 that were quickly 
deemed unconstitutional by federal courts; the states then passed revised laws in 1915.  If 
the blue sky laws were passed simultaneously with immediate changes in unobserved 
factors, then one should see statistically significant increases in dividend payouts in 1913 
and 1914—the immediate years following the passage of the first law in each state.  In 
contrast to this hypothesis, however, the coefficient estimates in column 4 indicate firms 
in Michigan and West Virginia only increase dividends in the immediate years following 
the passage of the constitutionally upheld blue sky laws in 1915, not in the laws passed in 
1913; the coefficients for IPLaw_Before(-2) and IPLaw_Before(-1) are statistically 
indistinguishable from zero.  This evidence further solidifies the causal interpretation of 
the estimated treatment effect.   
Finally, to test whether the impact of the blue sky laws is primarily driven by the 
mechanism of ex-post fraud reductions vs. securities pre-clearance, column 5 presents 
estimates for a subsample of treated firms in Maine and control firms in states which do 
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not pass a blue sky law during the sample period.  Maine’s blue sky law prohibited 
securities fraud after issuance but did not require securities registration with the 
government.  If securities pre-clearance is the main channel through which the blue sky 
laws affect corporate policy, then the measured treatment effect of the Maine law on 
payout policy should be zero.  In contrast to this hypothesis, however, dividends for 
Maine firms increase significantly following the passage of the Main blue sky law.   The 
estimated effects of the blue sky law in Maine are very similar both in magnitude and in 
timing to the effects estimated for firms in the full sample; dividends to sales increase by 
9.1% to 13.6% for companies in Maine.  Overall, the evidence illustrates the impact of 
the blue sky laws is not simply a function of securities registration, but rather, reflects the 
empirical importance of ex-post fraud reduction in affecting firm payout policy, 
consistent with the theoretical predictions of LLSV (2000).    
 
4.1.2 Equity Issuance 
The impact of investor protection statutes on firm common stock outstanding is 
estimated using specifications (1) and (2) with Ln(Sharesit) as the dependent variable, 
which is defined as the log of common shares outstanding of firm i in year t.16
The increase in equity outstanding is likely driven by outside investors rather than 
insiders, thereby implying that firms are able to raise more external capital from financial 
markets once the blue sky laws are in place.  There are two reasons for this interpretation.  
First, the blue sky laws generally did not apply to issuances of securities to insiders such 
as managers or pre-existing stock holders; if equity issuances were solely made to these 
groups, there should be no observed changes in equity outstanding around the blue sky 
laws (Reed and Washburn 1921).  Second, Holderness, Kroszner, and Sheehan (1999) 
  The 
results are presented in Table 4.  Collectively, the results indicate firms issue more equity 
once the blue sky laws are passed.  Columns 1 and 2 show the estimated treatment effect 
ranges between 0.095 and 0.128, which means that firms issue approximately 10% to 
13.7% more equity once the investor protection statutes are in place.  [Set Table 4 about 
here.] 
                                                 
16 Stock splits in the sample are rare; only one treatment firm appears to have reduced shares outstanding by 
half after the law is passed.   
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find that managerial stock ownership during the early part of the twentieth century was 
quite limited (at least relative to current times), suggesting that increases in common 
stock outstanding were unlikely to be realized by insiders exclusively.         
The findings are consistent with historical accounts of the immediate, increased 
availability of capital once investors were able to more securely invest in public offerings 
(Nation’s Business, 1917).  Because mining firms were primarily the types of companies 
engaged in securities fraud, it perhaps not surprising that these firms were able to raise 
more capital once investors had legal recourse for expropriation.  The findings are 
strongly supportive of theories that predict greater investor protections lead to increased 
participation in equity markets because investors become more willing to partake in 
capital investment (LLSV 1997, Shleifer and Wolfenzon 2002).   
To verify that the changes in equity issuance are not driven by unobservable 
changes in investment opportunities or other factors related to external financing, 
columns 3 and 4 illustrate that the observed changes in equity outstanding only occur in 
the years following the passage of the blue sky laws.  For the full sample, there are no 
statistically significant changes in shares outstanding in the immediate two years prior to 
the passage of the blue sky laws.  In contrast, outstanding equity increases by 6.4% to 
14.4% in the years following the passage of the blue sky laws.  A similar pattern can be 
found for the Michigan/West Virginia treatment subsample; the observed changes in 
equity outstanding occur only when the blue sky laws are passed and upheld after 1915 
rather than in the years 1913 and 1914.  Additionally, column 5 illustrates increased stock 
issuance is common for firms in Maine and mirrors the results for the full sample, further 
supporting the mechanism of ex-post fraud reduction as the key feature of the blue sky 
laws that impacts corporate financing decisions.   
 
4.2 Firm Size 
The impact of investor protection statutes on firm size is estimated using two 
measures of size utilized in previous research: plant, property, and equipment (PPE) and 
book value of assets.17
                                                 
17 The findings are similar if market capitalization is used as an additional measure of firm size.   
  Table 5 depicts regression results for specifications (1) and (2) 
using Ln(PPEit) as the dependent variable.  The findings indicate firms invest and grow 
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in size once the blue sky laws are in place.  The coefficient of IPLaw measures the 
approximate elasticity of physical capital to the passage of a blue sky law.  Columns 1 
and 2 show the elasticity of physical capital to the passage of investor protection laws is 
approximately between 29% and 39% (the point estimates of IPLaw range between 0.257 
and 0.327). Columns 3 through 5 illustrate the measured changes in PPE appear to occur 
only once the laws are passed; there are no significant changes in PPE in the immediate 
years prior to the passage of the blue sky laws.  [Set Table 5 about here.] As with the 
findings on payout policy and external financing, the results suggest the observed 
changes in physical capital stock are not driven by unobserved changes in investment 
opportunities around the passage of the laws.  Furthermore, the evidence in column 5 
shows the impact of the blue sky laws in Maine resembles the average effects of the blue 
sky laws for other sample states, supporting the notion that the legal prohibition of 
investor expropriation is the key channel through which the blue sky laws impact 
corporate investment.   
The data indicate mining firms are able to raise capital and invest the proceeds 
into property and equipment used for mineral exploration and excavation.  The results are 
consistent with various models that posit firms grow in size when investors are better 
protected from securities fraud (LLSV 1998, Shleifer and Wolfenzon 2002, LLS 2008).  
PPE is the primary asset of mining firms during this period; Table 2 indicates 
approximately 69% of assets are comprised of PPE for the typical mining firm.  Casual 
observation of the data further suggests the most valuable item within PPE is the property 
owned by a company.18
                                                 
18 This assessment if based on a limited number of companies which separate PPE into its individual 
components in the Poor’s manuals.     
  The high percentage of investment in property is attributed to 
the primary function of these firms: to extract minerals and metal ores from the land and 
quarries they owned.  Historical accounts of securities fraud during this period indicate 
that mining firms would often justify the use of external capital for the purposes of 
drilling and excavation.  Thus, it is perhaps not surprising that firm investment into 
physical capital increases once companies are more able to access capital markets for 
external financing.  The nature of PPE in the mining industry also helps explain the large 
magnitude of the treatment estimate.  Property is a unique asset in that it can be quickly 
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acquired in large quantities upon an immediate influx of capital (in contrast to machinery 
or other types of assets which could take more time to accumulate).  
 The impact of investor protection statutes on firm assets, measured by 
Ln(Assetsit), is estimated using specifications (1) and (2).  The results are presented in 
Table 6.  Overall, the findings indicate firms increase the size of their assets once the blue 
sky laws are passed.  [Set Table 6 about here.] Columns 1 and 2 show that the treatment 
effect ranges between 0.176 and 0.315, which implies an elasticity of assets to blue sky 
laws of 19.2% to 37%.19
 
  Columns 3 and 4 indicate the impact of the laws appears to 
manifest primarily in the years following the passage of the laws, rather than in the years 
prior to the laws being passed.  This evidence suggests the changes in book assets of 
firms are not simply driven by unobservable changes in investment opportunities or other 
factors related to firm growth.  Column 5 shows the impact on assets is similar for Maine 
firms as it is for the whole sample, further reinforcing the importance of ex-post fraud 
reduction as a key feature of the blue sky laws.  Collectively, the results strongly support 
theories that predict that investor protection laws promote growth in firm size (LLSV 
1998, Shleifer and Wolfenzon 2002, LLS 2008). 
4.3 Operating Performance and Valuation 
 The estimated effects of the blue sky laws on financing and investment decisions 
indicate firms respond to the laws by paying out greater dividends, raising equity from 
capital markets, and growing in firm size.  The findings are consistent with various 
theories regarding the importance of investor protections on corporate policy.  However, 
the evidence per se does not show whether the increased activity by firms is profitable.  
To investigate the performance implications of the blue sky laws, I estimate the effects of 
the blue sky laws on operating profitability and market valuations.   
 
 4.3.1 Operating Profits 
                                                 
19 The treatment effect estimate is only statistically significant at the 10% level in column 2, but this is 
likely due to the presence of non-PPE related items in firm assets that have little relation to investor 
protection statutes; these items are not expected to change around the passage of the blue sky laws and 
therefore they mitigate the total impact of the laws on book assets.   
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The impact of investor protection statutes on operating performance is estimated 
using specifications (1) and (2) with ROAit as the dependent variable, defined as the ratio 
of operating income before depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) to the book value of 
assets for firm i in year t.  EBITDA is calculated from firm income statements either by 
using data on Sales and Total/Operating Expenses or by using company reported figures 
for net profits.  The data on operating income is admittedly noisy, as the reporting of 
operating income appears to be less consistent across firms than balance sheet data.  For 
example, operating income is straightforward to calculate as the difference between sales 
and operating expenses for many companies; for other firms, however, operating income 
is simply proxied by a single item such as “net profits”.  Additionally, interest expenses, 
deprecation, and taxes are either explicitly reported or not disclosed at all (and are thus 
potentially components of “Total/Operating Expenses” listed in the income statements).  
While ROA is potentially mismeasured, however, it is unclear whether the data is 
systematically biased in any particular way.  It is likely that any measurement error 
increases the size of regression standard errors, causing coefficient estimates of IPLaw to 
understate the impact of investor protection laws on operating performance (in terms of 
statistical significance).   
 Regression estimates are presented in Table 7.  Columns 1-2 indicate the 
coefficient for IPLaw is positive and statistically significant, ranging between 0.058 and 
0.071.  Intuitively, these results imply the blue sky laws are associated with an average 
increase in ROA of 6% to 7.4%.  The estimates are only weakly significant at the 10% 
level.  While the weak statistical significance of the difference-in-difference estimates 
could be explained by measurement error, column 3 illustrates the results are more likely 
to be explained by the dynamics of ROA after the passage of the blue sky laws.  Column 
3 shows the positive, statistically significant changes in ROA occur only two years after 
the passage of the typical blue sky law.  [Set Table 7 about here.] These results are in line 
with the characteristics of the mining industry.  Mining firms are able to raise capital and 
increase the size of their mining operations once a blue sky law is passed, but profits 
which result from these decisions take time to be realized.  The relative lag time in 
profitability likely reflects the fact that mineral exploration and excavation are limited by 
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technological constraints (particularly during the 1900’s), thereby leading to observed 
changes in profitability only two years after a blue sky law gets passed.   
 Column 4 shows statistically significant changes in profitability occur two years 
after blue sky laws are passed in Michigan and West Virginia, illustrating the laws do not 
appear to be coincident with unobserved changes in investment opportunities.  Column 5 
shows that changes in operating profitability are also observed for firms in Maine, 
suggesting that ex-post fraud reduction is the salient feature of the blue sky laws.20
 
  
Overall, the results strongly support the hypothesis that improvements in investor 
protection law lead to positive NPV-driven changes in corporate financing and 
investment decisions, consistent with the theoretical models highlighted above.   
 4.3.2 Market Valuations 
The impact of investor protection statutes on market valuation-to-cash flow, 
MarketValueit / CashFlowit, following LLSV (2002), is estimated using specifications (1) 
and (2).  MarketValueit is defined as the product of shares outstanding and stock price at 
the end of year t for firm i.  CashFlowit is defined as sales minus the sum of operating 
expenses, taxes, and net capital expenditures for firm i in year t.21  The dependent 
variable captures the market’s valuation of a firm’s outstanding equity given its cash 
flows.  As discussed in LLSV (2002), this measure is a useful way to examine the 
market’s valuation of cash flows and expropriation risk; the higher is the risk that insiders 
may steal free cash flows, the lower is the conditional market value of equity.  Regression 
estimates are presented in Table 8.  Overall, the data indicate that price-to-cash flow 
ratios increase in response to the blue sky laws.22
                                                 
20 The findings for Maine also rule out the possibility that the improvements in ROA are simply the result 
of improved financial transparency due to the blue sky laws, since Maine’s law did not require securities 
pre-clearance and impact financial reporting.   
  [Set Table 8 about here.] 
21 Capital expenditures are not explicitly reported in the data; they are approximated by calculating annual 
changes in net PPE.  Changes in net working capital are not included because of lack of data availability; 
however, casual inspection of the data suggests that changes in net working capital likely have a marginal 
impact on total cash flows.    
22 The results are similar, if not stronger, if we instead examine price-to-earnings multiples.  Price-to-cash 
flow ratios are a more relevant valuation metric for the purposes of this study, mainly because price-to-
earnings may increase simply because of an increase in positive NPV capital expenditures, rather than a 
reduction in free cash flow expropriation risk.   
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Columns 1 and 2 depict an estimated treatment effect of 1.158 to 3.197.  
Assuming that the average firm has a market value-to-cash flow ratio of 8.28 (based on 
1910 figures from Table 2), these numbers suggest that price-to-cash flow multiples 
increase by 14.0% to 38.6%.  Investors in the market appear to strongly support the 
passage of the blue sky laws, and equity prices reflect the market’s anticipation of 
subsequent years of increased dividends resulting from the laws.   
Column 3 shows that there do not appear to be any pre-period time trends in 
price-to-cash flow ratios, supporting the notion that observed changes in policy and 
performance are not driven by underlying trends in unobservable investment 
opportunities.  Interestingly, column 4 indicates that market value-to-cash flow ratios 
appear to increase in 1913 and 1914, rather than increase solely in 1915 and thereafter (in 
contrast to previously examined corporate policies).  This finding could reflect the 
market’s belief that Michigan and West Virginia would eventually pass blue sky laws 
that were deemed constitutional even after its initial laws were rejected by federal courts.   
Column 5 illustrates that Maine firms increase in value significantly around the 
passage of the Maine blue sky law.  The valuation improvements observed in the 
immediate years following the law’s passage show that the market reacts favorably to the 
legal prohibition of ex-post fraud. Valuations of Maine companies also appear to increase 
in the year preceding the passage of the law; however, this observation is likely related to 
the fact that Maine’s law was adopted on April 9, 1913, and was probably discussed prior 
to the start of 1913 (Di Trolio, 2003-2004).  Assuming the market was able to correctly 
foresee the law’s eventual passage, it is perhaps not surprising that the stock price would 
adjust accordingly, even before the law was formally enforced.   
The evidence strongly supports theories that predict greater investor protections 
lead to improved market valuations (LLSV 2002, Shleifer and Wolfenzon 2002).  The 
reduction of insider expropriation risk engendered by the blue sky laws provided 
investors with greater incentive to invest in mining securities. The resulting increase in 
capital allowed mining firms to accumulate mineral tracts and properties, increase 
operating profits, and transfer larger dividends to investors.  Collectively, the results 
indicate that the blue sky laws were met with a favorable response by market participants.  
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4.4 Political Economy Hypotheses 
 The evidence thus far illustrates the effects of the blue sky laws on corporate 
financial policy, investment decisions, and value.  The analysis of time trend models for 
all firms and for subsamples of firms in Michigan and Virginia illustrate the observed 
changes in corporate behavior do not appear to be caused by unobservable changes in 
economic conditions.  Additionally, the analysis of companies in Maine indicates the 
protection of investors from ex-post fraud is the key mechanism by which the blue sky 
laws affect firm activity.   
Most academic research and anecdotal evidence point to the public interests of 
securities fraud prevention as the primary motivation for the passage of the blue sky laws 
(Seligman 1983, Reed and Washburn 1921, Mulvey 1914, Macey and Miller 1991).  The 
findings thus paint an accurate portrayal of the impact of an exogenous change in investor 
protection law on corporate policy and performance.  Nevertheless, this section explores 
two additional, alternative explanations for the passage of the blue sky laws, both of 
which speculate on the prevailing political environment of the early 1900’s.  The first 
hypothesis relates to state banking interests.  Macey and Miller (1991) argue the blue sky 
laws were passed at the behest of banks that competed with mining firms and other 
corporate entities for investor capital.  They theorize the laws would cause security 
issuance costs to rise, and that firms would pass these costs onto investors; in turn, 
investors would respond by redirecting their capital into banks rather than equity markets.   
This hypothesis is unlikely to have to significant explanatory power.  If this 
supposition were true, then one would expect to find deleterious effects of the blue sky 
laws on corporate policy and performance.  Firms should exhibit reduced capital market 
access, decrease in size, and have lower valuations.  In contrast, the findings illustrate 
investors appear to have benefited greatly from the blue sky laws and responded to their 
passage by channeling greater amounts of capital into mining firms and increasing stock 
valuations.23
 A second alternative explanation for the findings is that the blue sky laws were a 
manifestation of political lobbying efforts by incumbent mining firms.  While this 
   
                                                 
23 At the very least, the Macey and Miller (1991) hypothesis would suggest the evidence documented in this 
paper understates the positive impact of the blue sky laws on corporate decisions and performance. 
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hypothesis has not been mentioned in the extant literature on the blue sky laws, it is 
theoretically possible the laws were simply the result of incumbent industrial firms 
lobbying to reduce competition from potential market entrants by raising the costs of 
regulatory compliance.  If this hypothesis were true, then regression estimates of the 
treatment effects would overstate the impact of the blue sky laws on corporate policy and 
performance.  Specifically, by limiting entry by competitors, incumbent firms could find 
it easier to issue equity, grow in size, and increase profits due to their improved standing 
in product markets.   
 I evaluate this hypothesis by testing three of its implications.  The first implication 
is that if the blue sky laws improved incumbent firms’ product market power (implicitly, 
mining product markets are imperfectly competitive), then one might expect to observe 
higher prices and lower quantities of output produced by mining firms.  These changes 
could result from an inward shift in the supply curve due to reduced competition.   
Alternatively, holding aggregate supply constant, these changes could stem from the 
increased ability of incumbent firms to determine market prices and output.   
To test whether mining firms appear to have increased market power as a result of 
the blue sky laws, I estimate the changes in the prices and quantities of metal ores sold by 
mining firms.  As described in Section 3, I collect data on the quantities and prices of 
metal ores produced by firms in the early 1900’s.  Because metal ores are homogenous 
products with little differentiation in characteristics, one can easily compare the prices 
and quantities of metal ores across different regions.  I estimate specification (1) with 
product prices and quantities as dependent variables; specifically, I define Ln(Quantityit) 
as the log of ore quantities (tons or ounces) produced for firm i in year t, and Ln(Priceit)  
as the log of ore prices (per ton or ounce) sold by firm i in year t.   
  The results are presented in Table 9.  Columns 1-3 present estimates of the 
impact of the laws on the quantities of Copper, Silver, and Gold ores, while columns 4-6 
present the effects of the laws on the prices of Copper, Silver, and Gold ores.  The results 
for ore quantities indicate the blue sky laws are associated with increases in quantities of 
ores produced.  [Set Table 9 about here.] The coefficient estimates of 0.436 for IPLaw in 
column 2 and 0.661 for IPLaw in column 3 are economically large.  The results imply the 
passage of the blue sky laws cause mean quantities of silver sold to increase by 
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approximately 55%, while gold quantities almost double (94% increase).  The 
magnitudes are extremely large, yet somewhat imprecise, particularly in the case of gold 
production.  The impact on copper production is statistically insignificant, but the 
positive coefficient suggests copper production does not decrease significantly in 
response to the blue sky laws.  Columns 4-6 illustrate estimates of the laws’ effects on 
ore prices are statistically insignificant.  The measured coefficients on copper and gold 
prices are economically trivial, while the price effect for silver is qualitatively negative.24
Two additional implications of the industrial lobbying hypothesis are that the blue 
laws led to a reduction in the creation of new firms and also led to a reduction in the 
amount of capital raised by new firms.  To evaluate these implications, I collect data on 
new incorporations and their authorized capital stock in IPO’s (by state) and test whether 
the number of new companies and the amount of authorized capital stock decreased 
around the passage of the blue sky laws.  The data includes firms aggregated across all 
industries; I am unable to separately identify mining firms.  However, given that 
companies in non-mining industries were considered less fraudulent than mining firms, it 
is likely that the regression estimates of aggregate capital formation provide a lower 
bound for the impact of the blue sky laws on mining firms.  
   
The impact of investor protection statutes on new capital formation is estimated 
using OLS specification (3):  
 
Dependent Variable =  α + β1(IPLawit) + β2(Statei) + β3(Yeart) + εit (3) 
 
where subscripts it uniquely identify individual observations for state i in year t.  The 
dependent variables I examine are: Incorporationsit, the number of new incorporations in 
state i in year t; Ln(Stockit), the log of newly authorized capital stock in state i in year t; 
and Ln(Stockit/Incorporationsit), the log of capital stock authorized by the average new 
firm.   
Table 10 presents the results for regressions estimated separately for new firms of 
different sizes, based on median size indices calculated by Evans (1948).  Columns 1 and 
2 indicate total new capital stock weakly increases around the passage of the blue sky 
                                                 
24 As Table 8 illustrates, there are many more observations for the Quantity regressions than for the Price 
regressions; this disparity is simply due to data availability in the Poor’s manuals.  The results for the 
quantity regressions are similar if the sample is limited to those firms with non-missing price data.   
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laws, with smaller firms showing a slight, statistically significant increase.  [Set Table 10 
about here.]   The increase in capital stock ranges between 14.7% and 34.9%; the large 
magnitudes for these broader measures of capital formation can be attributed to the same 
reasons underlying disaggregated estimates presented in Tables 4-6.  Columns 3 and 4 
illustrate that the number of new firms created appears to increase (though estimates are 
imprecise), while columns 5 and 6 show that the amount of capital authorized by the 
average new firm increases significantly (by a percentage ranging between 6.6% and 
36.2%).   
Although the treatment effects are sometimes statistically insignificant, across all 
specifications, the positive coefficient estimates do not support the hypothesis that the 
blue sky laws lead to a decrease in capital formation either through a reduction in the 
amount of capital raised by new firms or through a reduction in the number of new firms 
created.25  The results from Tables 9 and 10 indicate product markets do not appear to 
become less competitive after investors are better protected from securities fraud. The 
findings thus suggest the blue sky laws did not result from lobbying efforts by incumbent 
mining firms.  If anything, the results actually illustrate that the blue sky laws are 
effective at promoting greater entry by new firms and facilitating capital allocation to 
newly formed companies.26
 
  The findings could even be interpreted as support for some 
of the broader implications of investor protection theories, which posit stronger legal 
institutions lead to greater economic growth (LLSV 1998, LLS 2008).   
Conclusion 
 The findings in this paper address recent debate concerning the theoretical and 
empirical relevance of investor protection law.  While various studies argue that 
safeguarding investors from insider expropriation is critical for a well-functioning system 
of corporate governance, others conclude that investor protection laws have little value.  
This paper improves upon the techniques utilized in existing empirical research 
                                                 
25 This evidence also mitigates the possibility that the results in Table 9 could be explained by 
monopolistic incumbent firms reducing entry, maintaining product pricing power, and simply lowering 
their own costs of production through additional securities issuance.   
26 These findings also support the notion that a non-trivial fraction of a firm’s initial shareholders are 
located within the firm’s state of incorporation.   
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comprised of cross-country studies that exploit variation in legal origin and within-
country studies that rely on time-series variation in regulatory reform.    
Holding legal origin fixed, and exploiting both cross-sectional and time series 
exogenous variation in the passage of U.S. state blue sky laws, I find firms respond to the 
introduction of investor protection statutes by increasing dividends, raising equity, and 
growing in size.  The laws are also associated with improvements in accounting 
performance and market valuations.  The evidence is strongly supportive of theories that 
predict investor protection law has a significant impact on corporate financing and 
investment policy.   
The results in this paper point to several avenues for additional research.  It would 
be interesting to explore the broader implications of investor protection law on the 
functioning of securities markets.  Recent work by Albuquerque and Wang (2008) has 
begun to explore this line of inquiry.  Another fruitful topic would be to explore the 
extent to which investor protection laws are compliments or substitutes for other 
dimensions of capital markets reform.  While this paper highlights the importance of 
investor protection law on corporate policy, there is still a need to understand why many 
countries do not have such legal institutions in place currently.   
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Impact of Investor Protection Laws on Payout Policy 
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Table 1  
Blue Sky Law Legislation and Sample States 
 This table lists sample states and the years in which they pass blue sky laws, along 
with the number of sample mining firms from each state.   
 
State Year of Law Passage Number of Firms 
Alabama 1919 1 
Arizona 1912 7 
California 1913 2 
Colorado 1923 8 
Delaware 1931 13 
Georgia 1913 1 
Kentucky 1920 1 
Maryland 1920 1 
Maine 1913 24 
Michigan 1915 29 
Minnesota 1917 6 
Missouri 1913 2 
Montana 1913 2 
Nebraska 1913 1 
New Jersey 1920 21 
Nevada ---- 1 
New York 1921 8 
Pennsylvania 1923 5 
South Dakota 1913 1 
Texas 1913 1 
Utah 1919 1 
Virginia 1916 2 
Washington 1923 1 
West Virginia 1915 11 
Wyoming  1919 4 
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Table 2 
Sample Descriptive Statistics 
 This table presents descriptive statistics of sample firm characteristics.  Panel A 
indicates the sample contains 152 unique firms in mining industries with observations 
taken across sample years 1899-1918 for a total of 1,215 firm-year observations.  Mean 
age of firm refers to the average age of a firm in a typical firm-year observation.  Panel B 
contains means and standard deviations (in parenthesis) of firm characteristics in 1910 
(prior to the passage of all blue sky laws), separated by all firms, firms in states which 
pass laws during the sample period (<=1918), and firms in states which pass the laws 
after the sample period (>1918).  % PPE is the fraction of (Book) Assets invested in 
Plant, Property, and Equipment.  Market Capitalization is number of shares outstanding 
(Common Shares) times share price as of end of December, 1910.  Dividend/Sales is the 
ratio of dividends on common stock to Sales.  ROA is defined as operating earnings 
divided by book value of assets.  Market Cap/Cash Flow is the ratio of Market 
Capitalization to Free Cash flow.  All values are in nominal 1910 dollars. 
Panel A: Sample Characteristics 
Total Number of Firms 152 
Sample Years 1899-1918 
Total Number of Firm-Year Observations 1,215 
Mean year of Incorporation 1898 
Mean age (years) 15.33 
Panel B: Sample Firm Characteristics 
Year = 1910 All Firms Law Passed > 1918 Law Passed <= 1918 
Age 
 
13.54 12.66 14.18 
(14.10) (14.06) (14.21) 
Sales ($MM) 3.57 4.72 2.63 
(6.25) (7.53) (4.88) 
Dividends/Sales 0.27 0.27 0.26 
(0.31) (0.23) (0.36) 
Assets ($MM) 15.50 23.80 9.17 
(28.30) (36.10) (18.50) 
% PPE 0.69 0.73 0.66 
(0.23) (0.20) (0.25) 
Common Shares (MM) 0.61 0.74 0.51 
(1.03) (1.06) (1.00) 
Market Capitalization ($MM) 13.20 13.90 12.90 
(29.20) (27.80) (30.40) 
ROA 0.14 0.13 0.15 
 (0.42) (0.16) (0.54) 
Market Cap/Cash Flow 8.28 9.57 7.69 
 (17.15) (11.69) (19.35) 
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Table 3 
Estimated Effects of Investor Protection Laws on Payout Policy 
 This table presents estimates of the effects of state investor protection (blue sky) laws on 
firm dividend payments.  The baseline specification is an OLS linear model: 
 
Dividendsit / Salesit = α + β1(IPLawit) + β2(Firmi) + β3(Yeart) + εit, 
 
where subscripts it uniquely identify individual observations for firm i in year t.  Dividendsit / 
Salesit is the ratio of common stock dividends to sales for firm i in year t.  IPLawit is an indicator 
of whether the state of incorporation of firm i has passed an IP Law by year t.  In columns 3-5, 
IPLawit is replaced by IPLaw_Beforeit(-2, -1) and IPLaw_Afterit(0, 1, 2+), which are indicators of 
whether the observation for firm i in year t takes place (2 years before, 1 year before) and (0 years 
after, 1 year after, 2 or more years after), respectively, an investor protection law is passed in the 
state of incorporation for firm i.  Firmi and Yeart denote firm and year fixed effects, respectively.  
Sample describes the firms analyzed in each column: Full refers to all firms, MI/WV refers to 
firms in Michigan, West Virginia, and all states where an IP law is not passed during the sample 
period, ME refers to firms in Maine and all states where an IP law is not passed during the sample 
period.  Standard errors, reported in parentheses, are heteroskedasticity-robust and clustered by 
state. 
 
 
Dependent Variable: Dividends/Sales 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
IPLaw 0.062*** 0.131***    
 (0.011) (0.025)    
IPLaw_Before(-2)   0.002 0.024 -0.071*** 
   (0.020) (0.022) (0.022) 
IPLaw_Before(-1)   -0.042 -0.140 0.003 
   (0.054) (0.087) (0.035) 
IPLaw_After(0)   0.093*** 0.073** 0.136*** 
   (0.028) (0.031) (0.020) 
IPLaw_After(1)   0.101*** 0.130*** 0.091** 
   (0.031) (0.032) (0.036) 
IPLaw_After(2+)   0.136*** 0.262** 0.120*** 
   (0.042) (0.095) (0.032) 
Constant 0.263*** 0.360** 0.358** 0.430* 0.429*** 
 (0.002) (0.137) (0.139) (0.205) (0.020) 
Firm F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year F.E. No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.014 0.053 0.051 0.075 0.134 
Sample Full Full Full MI/WV ME 
No. of firms 105 105 105 73 63 
No. of obs. 669 669 669 474 372 
***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively 
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Table 4 
Estimated Effects of Investor Protection Laws on Equity Issuance 
 This table presents estimates of the effects of state investor protection (blue sky) laws on 
firm common stock outstanding.  The baseline specification is an OLS linear model: 
 
Ln(Sharesit) = α + β1(IPLawit) + β2(Firmi) + β3(Yeart) + εit, 
 
where subscripts it uniquely identify individual observations for firm i in year t.  Ln(Shares)it 
is the log of the number of outstanding shares of common stock of firm i in year t.  IPLawit is 
an indicator of whether the state of incorporation of firm i has passed an IP Law by year t.  
In columns 3-5, IPLawit is replaced by IPLaw_Beforeit(-2, -1) and IPLaw_Afterit(0, 1, 2+), 
which are indicators of whether the observation for firm i in year t takes place (2 years 
before, 1 year before) and (0 years after, 1 year after, 2 or more years after), respectively, an 
investor protection law is passed in the state of incorporation for firm i.  Firmi and Yeart 
denote firm and year fixed effects, respectively.  Sample describes the firms analyzed in each 
column: Full refers to all firms, MI/WV refers to firms in Michigan, West Virginia, and all 
states where an IP law is not passed during the sample period, ME refers to firms in Maine 
and all states where an IP law is not passed during the sample period.  Standard errors, 
reported in parentheses, are heteroskedasticity-robust and clustered by state. 
 
 
Dependent Variable: : Ln(Shares Outstanding)            
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
IPLaw 0.128*** 0.095***    
 (0.026) (0.032)    
IPLaw_Before(-2)   -0.010 -0.033 -0.020 
   (0.024) (0.020) (0.015) 
IPLaw_Before(-1)   0.004 -0.035 -0.051* 
   (0.025) (0.021) (0.028) 
IPLaw_After(0)   0.064* 0.021 0.057** 
   (0.034) (0.029) (0.021) 
IPLaw_After(1)   0.106** 0.114** 0.032 
   (0.048) (0.042) (0.029) 
IPLaw_After(2+)   0.144** 0.095 0.069 
   (0.062) (0.064) (0.040) 
Constant 12.256*** 12.263*** 12.237*** 12.144*** 12.686*** 
 (0.006) (0.017) (0.045) (0.021) (0.029) 
Firm F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year F.E. No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.041 0.049 0.054 0.029 0.087 
Sample Full Full Full MI/WV ME 
No. of firms 150 150 150 102 85 
No. of obs. 1175 1171 1171 814 653 
***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively 
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Table 5 
Estimated Effects of Investor Protection Laws on Firm Size (PPE) 
 This table presents estimates of the effects of state investor protection (blue sky) laws on 
firm plant, property, and equipment.  The baseline specifications are OLS linear models: 
 
Ln(PPEit) = α + β1(IPLawit) + β2(Firmi) + β3(Yeart) + εit, 
 
 
where subscripts it uniquely identify individual observations for firm i in year t.  Ln(PPE)it is the 
log of Plant, Property, and Equipment of firm i in year t.  IPLawit is an indicator of whether the 
state of incorporation of firm i has passed an IP Law by year t.  In columns 3-5, IPLawit is 
replaced by IPLaw_Beforeit(-2, -1) and IPLaw_Afterit(0, 1, 2+), which are indicators of whether 
the observation for firm i in year t takes place (2 years before, 1 year before) and (0 years after, 1 
year after, 2 or more years after), respectively, an investor protection law is passed in the state of 
incorporation for firm i.  Firmi and Yeart denote firm and year fixed effects, respectively.  Sample 
describes the firms analyzed in each column: Full refers to all firms, MI/WV refers to firms in 
Michigan, West Virginia, and all states where an IP law is not passed during the sample period, 
ME refers to firms in Maine and all states where an IP law is not passed during the sample period.  
Standard errors, reported in parentheses, are heteroskedasticity-robust and clustered by state. 
 
 
Dependent Variable: Ln(PPE) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
IPLaw 0.327*** 0.257**    
 (0.088) (0.099)    
IPLaw_Before(-2)   -0.016 -0.130 0.013 
   (0.055) (0.076) (0.133) 
IPLaw_Before(-1)   0.030 -0.051 0.179** 
   (0.073) (0.055) (0.080) 
IPLaw_After(0)   0.190* 0.165 0.262*** 
   (0.106) (0.123) (0.044) 
IPLaw_After(1)   0.289** 0.585** 0.217*** 
   (0.128) (0.261) (0.061) 
IPLaw_After(2+)   0.352** 0.342 0.302 
   (0.170) (0.588) (0.177) 
Constant 14.893*** 14.796*** 14.790*** 14.617*** 15.274*** 
 (0.021) (0.076) (0.082) (0.054) (0.106) 
Firm F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year F.E. No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.059 0.081 0.084 0.066 0.047 
Sample Full Full Full MI/WV ME 
No. of firms 134 134 134 90 79 
No. of obs. 871 871 871 572 531 
***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively 
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Table 6 
Estimated Effects of Investor Protection Laws on Firm Size (Assets) 
 This table presents estimates of the effects of state investor protection (blue sky) laws on 
firm size.  The baseline specification is an OLS linear model: 
 
Ln(Assetsit) = α + β1(IPLawit) + β2(Firmi) + β3(Yeart) + εit, 
 
where subscripts it uniquely identify individual observations for firm i in year t.  Ln(Assets)it is 
the log of the book value of assets of firm i in year t.  IPLawit is an indicator of whether the state 
of incorporation of firm i has passed an IP Law by year t.  In columns 3-5, IPLawit is replaced by 
IPLaw_Beforeit(-2, -1) and IPLaw_Afterit(0, 1, 2+), which are indicators of whether the 
observation for firm i in year t takes place (2 years before, 1 year before) and (0 years after, 1 
year after, 2 or more years after), respectively, an investor protection law is passed in the state of 
incorporation for firm i.  Firmi and Yeart denote firm and year fixed effects, respectively.  Sample 
describes the firms analyzed in each column: Full refers to all firms, MI/WV refers to firms in 
Michigan, West Virginia, and all states where an IP law is not passed during the sample period, 
ME refers to firms in Maine and all states where an IP law is not passed during the sample period.  
Standard errors, reported in parentheses, are heteroskedasticity-robust and clustered by state. 
 
 
Dependent Variable: Ln(Assets)            
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
IPLaw 0.315*** 0.176*    
 (0.100) (0.095)    
IPLaw_Before(-2)   -0.061 -0.241** 0.033 
   (0.070) (0.090) (0.073) 
IPLaw_Before(-1)   0.024 -0.089* 0.078** 
   (0.040) (0.046) (0.034) 
IPLaw_After(0)   0.135* 0.163** 0.085** 
   (0.071) (0.071) (0.032) 
IPLaw_After(1)   0.169* 0.382*** 0.066 
   (0.093) (0.097) (0.038) 
IPLaw_After(2+)   0.164* 0.065 0.147** 
   (0.081) (0.205) (0.049) 
Constant 15.253*** 15.367*** 15.369*** 15.090*** 15.948*** 
 (0.024) (0.177) (0.180) (0.039) (0.040) 
Firm F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year F.E. No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.133 0.215 0.216 0.224 0.197 
Sample Full Full Full MI/WV ME 
No. of firms 141 141 141 94 79 
No. of obs. 963 963 963 654 545 
***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively 
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Table 7 
Estimated Effects of Investor Protection Laws on Operating Performance 
 This table presents estimates of the effects of state investor protection (blue sky) laws on 
firm operating performance (ROA).  The baseline specification is an OLS linear model: 
 
ROAit = α + β1(IPLawit) + β2(Firmi) + β3(Yeart) + εit, 
 
 
where subscripts it uniquely identify individual observations for firm i in year t.  ROAit is the ratio 
of operating income before depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) to the book value of assets 
of firm i in year t.  IPLawit is an indicator of whether the state of incorporation of firm i has 
passed an IP Law by year t.  In columns 3-5, IPLawit is replaced by IPLaw_Beforeit(-2, -1) and 
IPLaw_Afterit(0, 1, 2+), which are indicators of whether the observation for firm i in year t takes 
place (2 years before, 1 year before) and (0 years after, 1 year after, 2 or more years after), 
respectively, an investor protection law is passed in the state of incorporation for firm i.  Firmi 
and Yeart denote firm and year fixed effects, respectively.  Sample describes the firms analyzed in 
each column: Full refers to all firms, MI/WV refers to firms in Michigan, West Virginia, and all 
states where an IP law is not passed during the sample period, ME refers to firms in Maine and all 
states where an IP law is not passed during the sample period.  Standard errors, reported in 
parentheses, are heteroskedasticity-robust and clustered by state. 
 
 
Dependent Variable: ROA            
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
IPLaw 0.071* 0.058*    
 (0.038) (0.033)    
IPLaw_Before(-2)   -0.017 -0.025 -0.012* 
   (0.012) (0.014) (0.006) 
IPLaw_Before(-1)   -0.010 -0.035** 0.019 
   (0.010) (0.012) (0.011) 
IPLaw_After(0)   0.038 0.032 0.024** 
   (0.025) (0.029) (0.010) 
IPLaw_After(1)   0.061 0.139* 0.028** 
   (0.041) (0.064) (0.010) 
IPLaw_After(2+)   0.032** 0.092*** 0.035** 
   (0.016) (0.014) (0.013) 
Constant 0.128*** 0.155*** 0.158*** 0.162*** 0.090*** 
 (0.011) (0.010) (0.007) (0.006) (0.021) 
Firm F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year F.E. No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.048 0.125 0.127 0.127 0.086 
Sample Full Full Full MI/WV ME 
No. of firms 115 115 115 73 64 
No. of obs. 619 619 619 410 329 
***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively 
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Table 8 
Estimated Effects of Investor Protection Laws on Market Value 
 This table presents estimates of the effects of state investor protection (blue sky) laws on 
firm market capitalization to free cash flow.  The baseline specification is an OLS linear model: 
 
MarketCapitalizationit / CashFlowit = α + β1(IPLawit) + β2(Firmi) + β3(Yeart) + εit, 
 
where subscripts it uniquely identify individual observations for firm i in year t.  
MarketCapitalizationit / CashFlowit is the ratio of market capitalization to free cash flow of firm i 
in year t.  IPLawit is an indicator of whether the state of incorporation of firm i has passed an IP 
Law by year t.  In columns 3-5, IPLawit is replaced by IPLaw_Beforeit(-2, -1) and 
IPLaw_Afterit(0, 1, 2+), which are indicators of whether the observation for firm i in year t takes 
place (2 years before, 1 year before) and (0 years after, 1 year after, 2 or more years after), 
respectively, an investor protection law is passed in the state of incorporation for firm i.  Firmi 
and Yeart denote firm and year fixed effects, respectively.  Sample describes the firms analyzed in 
each column: Full refers to all firms, MI/WV refers to firms in Michigan, West Virginia, and all 
states where an IP law is not passed during the sample period, ME refers to firms in Maine and all 
states where an IP law is not passed during the sample period.  Standard errors, reported in 
parentheses, are heteroskedasticity-robust and clustered by state. 
 
 
Dependent Variable: Market Capitalization to Free Cash Flow 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
IPLaw 1.158*** 3.197**    
 (0.370) (1.227)    
IPLaw_Before(-2)   0.325 6.834* 1.431 
   (1.792) (3.052) (3.454) 
IPLaw_Before(-1)   1.360 12.364** 13.469*** 
   (2.373) (4.481) (2.468) 
IPLaw_After(0)   3.359 1.570 9.569** 
   (2.840) (3.976) (3.115) 
IPLaw_After(1)   4.608** 13.481*** 7.345* 
   (1.862) (2.998) (3.078) 
IPLaw_After(2+)   4.207 13.228*** 2.309 
   (2.451) (1.891) (3.154) 
Constant 5.732*** 0.582 0.423 -3.838** 10.242* 
 (0.121) (4.200) (4.106) (1.175) (4.427) 
Firm F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year F.E. No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.004 0.032 0.035 0.107 0.189 
Sample Full Full Full MI/WV ME 
No. of firms 79 79 79 52 44 
No. of obs. 402 402 402 282 191 
***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively 
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Table 9 
Estimated Effects of Investor Protection Laws on Product Markets 
 This table presents estimates of the effects of state investor protection (blue sky) laws on quantities and prices of metal ores produced by 
mining firms.  The baseline specification is an OLS linear model: 
 
Ln(Quantityit) [or] Ln(Priceit) = α + β1(IPLawit) + β2(Firmi) + β3(Yeart) + εit 
 
where subscripts it uniquely identify individual observations for firm i in year t.  Ln(Quantityit) is the log of quantity (tons or ounces) of metal ores 
produced by firm i in year t (columns 1-3).  Ln(Priceit) is the log of price of ores produced by firm i in year t (columns 4-6).  Firmi and Yeart 
denote firm and year fixed effects, respectively.  Each column in the table refers to a distinct ore: copper, silver, or gold.  Standard errors, reported 
in parentheses, are heteroskedasticity-robust and clustered by state. 
 
 
 Dependent Var.: Ln(Quantity) Dependent Var.: Ln(Price) 
 Copper Silver Gold Copper Silver Gold 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
IPLaw 0.098 0.436** 0.661* 0.002 -0.031 0.001 
 (0.159) (0.180) (0.324) (0.016) (0.044) (0.218) 
Constant 15.634*** 13.138*** 9.218*** 2.431*** 2.570*** 2.612*** 
 (0.073) (0.335) (0.143) (0.001) (0.042) (0.179) 
Firm F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.110 0.166 0.125 0.905 0.251 0.097 
No. of firms 66 44 38 31 17 13 
No. of obs. 498 281 259 176 80 79 
***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively 
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Table 10: 
Estimated Effects of Investor Protection Laws on Firm Creation 
 This table presents estimates of the effects of state investor protection (blue sky) laws on 
new firm incorporations and total authorized capital stock.  The baseline specification is an OLS 
linear model: 
 
Ln(Stockit) [or] Ln(Incorporationsit) [or] Ln(Stockit/Incorporationsit)= α + β1(IPLawit) + 
β2(Statei) + β3(Yeart) + εit 
 
 
where subscripts it uniquely identify individual observations for state i in year t.  Ln(Stockit) is the 
log of newly authorized capital stock in state i in year t.  Incorporationsit is the number of new 
incorporations in state i in year t.  IPLawit is an indicator of whether state i has passed an Investor 
Protection (IP) Law by year t.  Firmi and Yeart denote firm and year fixed effects, respectively.  
Sample refers to the sample of firms (all or small), based on median size indices in Evans (1948).  
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
 
 
 Ln(Authorized Capital Stock) 
Ln(New 
Incorporations) 
Ln(Authorized Stock / 
New Incorporations) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
IPLaw 0.300 0.138* 0.074 0.074 0.309** 0.064 
 (0.183) (0.083) (0.054) (0.052) (0.149) (0.049) 
Constant 11.830*** 9.046*** 7.771*** 7.710*** 5.139*** 1.400*** 
 (0.486) (0.220) (0.142) (0.136) (0.395) (0.130) 
Firm F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.647 0.639 0.717 0.720 0.619 0.584 
Sample Full Small Full Small Full Small 
No. of obs. 230 227 227 227 227 227 
No. of states 12 12 12 12 12 12 
***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively 
 
 
 
 
 
